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ABSTRACT
Acquisition streamlining involves taking action to pre-
clude or eliminate non-cost-effective requirements in
design, development and production. It is based on the con-
cept that by applying pertinent contract requirements and
allowing early industry involvement in recommending the most
cost-effective solutions, the Department of Defense can
reduce the cost and/or time of system acquisition and life
cycle cost without degrading system effectiveness. This
thesis focuses on the Streamlining Initiative, its back-
ground and composition, where and how it has been utilized,
and when and how it can be applied to achieve the least cost
acquisition. The study looks to two of the military
services, the Army and the Navy, and how they each have
approached streamlining. Specifically, the thesis looks at
the Army Streamlined Acquisition Program (ASAP) and the Navy
T-4 5 Training System as current management initiatives and
procedures to reduce the cost and improve the quality of
equipment and systems procured by the Department of Defense.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past the media has featured innumerable headlines
and stories. Congress has conducted hearings and investiga-
tions, articles and books have been written and discussed,
GAO and other agencies have investigated and reported, and
yet the problems perceived with procurement within the
Department of Defense have persisted, and have even grown in
some instances.
The average American taxpayer not only believed defense
spending was wasteful and out of control, but that the mili-
tary was unable to perform its mission when called upon to
do so, as evidenced by the aborted Iranian hostage rescue.
The scenario described has been a low point in the recent
history of the American military forces.
President Reagan's administration arrived in Washington
with a mandate from the American people to restore and
strengthen the defense posture of the United States. In
order to accomplish the necessary readiness of the armed
services, a number of significant steps had to be taken.
One of the most important of these steps would be to reform
the acquisition process of the Department of Defense. This
would have the effect of not only reducing the cost of the
weapons and equipment procured, but simultaneously improving
their quality and/or performance.
In the past, defense contractors have been subjected to
a barrage of requirements and details instructing them not
only what to do, and how to do it, but also how to manage
while they were doing it. Military specifications and stan-
dards were used to surround the acquisition process with a
virtual fence of rules and requirements so as to best pro-
tect the interests of the Government. This tendency toward
over-application of specifications and requirements may have
reduced risk, but it also definitely resulted in unnecessary
costs.
There are more than 40,000 Department of Defense stan-
dards and specifications currently in print, which have the
potential to cause problems in terms of over-specified
requirements, ambiguous wording, obsolete paragraphs and
overlapping requirements which may or may not be compatible
with one another. In addition, there are literally millions
of contractor generated drawings, which the government has
acquired which also may contain the same over-specified
requirements. [Ref. 1] Therefore, the magnitude of the
problem is so large as to be termed "undefinable" in a pre-
liminary assessment issued by the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, William H. Taft IV on November 8, 1984. [Ref. 2]
Acquisition streamlining is the latest DoD thrust to
combat over-specified, ambiguous, redundant requirements.
It is based on the concept of applying only specifically
pertinent contract requirements and allowing early industry
8
involvement in recommending the most cost-effective solu-
tions. DoD can then reduce the cost and/or time of system
acquisition and life cycle cost with no loss in the quality
of the system or equipment.
Acquisition streamlining is not a new idea, it has been
discussed and debated in the literature involving DoD acqui-
sition for the past decade. Fueled by media sensationalism
and possible Gramm-Rudman budget cuts, the Army, Navy, Air
Force and Marine Corps have begun to do more than talk
streamlining. They are actually doing it.
Acquisition streamlining involves taking action to pre-
clude or eliminate the non-cost-effective requirements in
design, development and production. This can be accom-
plished in four ways:
1. Specify requirements in terms of the results desired
(performance specifications) rather than "how-to-
design" (design specifications)
.
2. Preclude premature application of design solutions,
specifications, and standards.
3. Tailor the contract requirements to fit the unique
circumstances of each acquisition program.
4. Limit the contractual applicability of referenced
documents to only those that are essential.
Deputy Secretary of Defense William H. Taft IV has taken
the lead by having issued DoD Directive 5000.4 3 on January
15, 198 6. This document directs DoD to undertake a program
of Acquisition Streamlining in order to increase the cost-
effectiveness of system acquisition requirements. [Ref. 3]
The main thrust of the thesis will be a discussion of
the Streamlining Initiative, what it is, its background and
composition, where and how it has been utilized, and
finally, where, when and how streamlining can be applied so
as to achieve the least cost acquisition.
In order to accomplish this task, the thesis will first
look briefly at the history of DoD standardization, and the
organizations tasked with developing and ensuring materiel
standardization is achieved during the design, development
and acquisition process.
Then the study will examine how two of the services have
approached streamlining. The Army and the Navy have
interpreted, and utilized the streamlining concept in
different ways.
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II. THE DEFENSE STANDARDIZATION AND
SPECIFICATION PROGRAM
A. INTRODUCTION
The Defense Standardization and Specification Program
(DSSP) was established in 1952. It was designed to improve
the operational readiness and cost effectiveness of defense
materiel through the development and use of common systems,
subsystems, equipment, components, parts, materials, techni-
cal data and engineering practices. [Ref. 4]
The DSSP is a "single, integrated defense-wide program
managed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering (USDRE)." [Ref. 4]
B. STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
Public Law 82-436, 1952, which first established the
DSSP, was later superseded by Title 10, U.S. Code, Chapter
14 5, Cataloging and Standardization. It contains the statu-
tory requirement for the Cataloging and Standardization
Program. [Ref. 4]
DoD Directive 4120.2, "Defense Standardization and
Specification Program" invokes the basic policy regarding
DoD standardization. It states it is Department of Defense
policy that "there shall be a single integrated Defense
Standardization and Specification Program (DSSP) and a
11
uniform series of specifications, standards, and related
documents . " [ Re f . 6
]
C. OBJECTIVES
The objective of the program is to "ensure that optimal
materiel standardization is achieved during the design,
development and acquisition process. This is accomplished
by applying standardization principles, such as item common-
ality, interchangeability, and interface compatibility, in
engineering and acquisition management." [Ref. 4]
In order to accomplish the objectives of the DSSP
various actions are taken:
1. The development of standardized products and practices
to satisfy military requirements.
2
.
The preparation of standardization documents for
engineering and acquisition use for the standardized
products and practices.
3. The prevention of duplicative and overlapping descrip-
tions of materiels and services such as specifica-
tions, standards, engineering drawings, etc.
4. Encouraging the use, or reuse of, proven technology
and design features for equipment and systems.
5. The establishment of uniform grades and types, classes
and sizes of items and performance requirements which
help define the characteristics of materiel.
6. The development of methods to periodically screen the
items in the inventory to reduce the number of items
to the minimum level which is compatible with the
needs of DoD. [Ref. 4]
D. ORGANIZATION/RESPONSIBILITIES
DoD Directive 412 0.3 goes on further to state that
though the policy shall be integrated and uniform, the
12
procedures by which the DSSP is administered shall be a
"decentralized program with management authority and
responsibilities . . . delegated to the DoD Components."
[Ref. 5]
The overall DoD policy, guidance and administration is
the responsibility of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering (USDR&E) . Advice and guidance on
standardization issues are provided to the USDR&E by the
Defense Standardization and Specification Board (DMSSB)
.
The board is staffed by Flag rank/Senior Executive Service
representatives from each Department, the DLA and the Office
of the Secretary of Defense.
The Defense Materiel Specifications and Standards Office
(DMSSO) is responsible for:
1. Administering and managing the DSSP, including estab-
lishing policies, procedures, program guidance and
controls.
2. Assigning to the DoD Components the responsibilities
for the implementation of specified portions or seg-
ments of the DSSP.
3. Establishing, reporting and surveillance techniques
which measure the degree to which the program objec-
tives are achieved.
4. Issuing DoD 4120. 3-M Defense Standardization Manual.
[Ref. 5]
Within each Service and DLA, a Departmental Standardiza-
tion Office has been established to manage those portions of
the DSSP assigned to the respective Department and Agency.
[Ref. 5]
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The products used by the services are grouped into
"families" and are identified as Federal Supply Classes
(FSCs) . Management and engineering practices, such as
reliability, maintainability, safety and configuration
management, are identified as Standardization Areas. "For
each FSC and Standardization Area, a military organization
known as an Assignee Activity (for FSCs) and Lead Service
Activity (for Areas) is delegated the responsibility for
analyzing, planning for, and ensuring that optimal standar-
dization is accomplished." [Ref. 5]
The actual development of specifications, standards and
related documents is performed by the DoD organizations
known as the Preparing Activities. It is their responsibil-
ity to develop, maintain, and coordinate individual DSSP
documents, and to ensure that they meet mission require-
ments. The Assignee and Lead Service Activities may also
function as Preparing Activities. Other activities or
organizations such as the user or participating activities
may also participate in the planning, management, and
preparation of FSC/Standardization analyses, plans, and
standardization documents. [Ref. 5]
The actual organization chart, or wiring diagram, is
shown in Figure 1. (There have been several changes since
the diagram was first drawn. For the Navy, NAVMAT no longer
exists, while the Army organization identified as DARCOM is
now known as AMC. Also a new Army command, LABCOM, was
14
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Source: [Ref. 4]
Figure 1. Structure for Standardization Management
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created which is composed of the laboratories and major
subordinate command R&D centers.)
E. PREPARATION OF SPECIFICATIONS AND STANDARDS
There are Preparing Activities listed under each major
service and DLA. These are the organizations tasked with
the actual development of specifications, standards and
related documents. However, according to An Overview of The
Defense Standardization and Specification Program (DSSP)
Assignee and Lead Service Activities may also function as
Preparing Activities. Additionally, other activities or
organizations such as the user or participating activities
may also participate in the preparation of standardization
documents. [Ref. 4]
Therefore, the preparation of specifications and stan-
dards is the responsibility of a number of different organi-
zations within the three major services and DLA. It is
decentralized to the extent that each service has one, or
more, organizations preparing specifications and standards.
16
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM
A. INTRODUCTION
General Richard H. Thompson, Commander, Army Materiel
Command, speaking at the Second National Conference on
Acquisition Streamlining, stated,
Procurement bridges the gap between the determination of
our needs or requirements and the actual delivery of a
product or service. It provides the vehicle for specify-
ing what we want, when and where we want it, and how much
we will pay for it. Being rooted in law, the procurement
process is dynamic. While the basic steps are relatively
constant, the procedures used to accomplish them change
frequently. Most changes are driven by legislative action
while some are driven by our own initiatives to improve
the process. [Ref. 6]
The Streamlining Initiative is one of those changes
which has been proposed, and is in the process of implemen-
tation, by the Department of Defense. It is designed to
change the procurement procedures for the military services.
The Streamlining Initiative has been developed in
response to a public perception that the cost of DoD systems
and equipment are prohibitive; that the process has become
too overregulated and bureaucratic; that it takes so long to
develop and produce a system that when it is fielded the
technology is obsolete. [Ref. 7]
B. BACKGROUND
The Streamlining Initiative is fairly new. The DoD
Directive 5000.43, "Acquisition Streamlining" was only
17
signed on January 15, 1986. "Streamlining" as a concept,
however, is not a new idea for the Department of Defense.
An article published in the January 1973 issue of Defense
Management Journal entitled, "Source Selection Process Faces
Winds of Chicago" cites the need for improving the acquisi-
tion process by clarifying and simplifying the Request For
Proposals (RFPs) . [Ref . 8]
In the article, the Commander of the Aeronautical Sys-
tems Division, Air Force Systems Command, discusses the
"stereotyped RFP format, which attempted to incorporate all
the Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) instruc-
tions, evolved over the years to the point where it often
managed in 250 pages or so to obfuscate issues with the
skill of a magician." He views the "prototype programs,
emphasizing simplified and streamlined management, procure-
ment and development approaches provides the kind of
environment in which imaginative ideas can surface, be
applied and tested." [Ref. 8]
He states, "Undoubtedly, the best example of this fresh
acquisition approach" is a Lightweight Fighter Prototype
Project which resulted from a study initiated by a former
Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Packard. [Ref. 8]
In 1973, Mr. Packard also went on record to say,
Management systems . . . The principle here should be that
the DoD should not have to specify the management systems
for the contractor. If the contractor does not have a
management system adequate to manage a program, he should
not be given the contract. [Ref. 9]
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Later the same year, another article appeared in the
Defense Management Journal . this one entitled, "Culprit of
Contract Appeals is Ambiguous Specifications." In the arti-
cle, the Deputy Director, Contract Administration Director-
ate, DCASR, New York, quotes a 1969 report by the Joint
Logistics Review Board, concerning procurement and produc-
tion. The report states,
the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) con-
siders approximately 900 cases a year and estimates that
50 percent of these are caused by improper specifications.
The number of cases involving specifications being
appealed to the ASBCA has been increasing since 1965.
[Ref. 10]
The article continues with the statement that,
There is presently a deep concern over rising costs of
defense procurement, the contingencies and mounting
costs . . . one of the most complex sources of contract
litigation involving complex technical issues and unexpec-
ted cost is found in the specifications, work statements,
drawings and other technical data . . . [Ref. 10]
Lieutenant Colonel Donald M. Keith, Director of the
National Maintenance Point, U.S. Army Security Agency
Materiel Support Command, and Charles A. McCarthy, stated in
1976, that
the specification for equipment is probably the most
important document that emerges in the user-producer
relationship. Empirically, it is in this process that the
Government most often fails to 'say what it means, and
mean what it says. • [Ref. 11]
LTC Keith and Mr. McCarthy discuss other problems in
their 1976 Armv Loaistician article, "Ask For It Clearly."
Their description of one of the problems is,
Clutter in a specification is bad. Worse still are state-
ments that lack clarity ... In a recent proposal
19
evaluation, an evaluator was overhead to say, 'How in
blazes could a contractor propose such a stupid response?
•
When the specification was checked, the requirement was
found to be so poorly worded that it did not convey the
user's need, even to the evaluator who knew what was
required. In fact, the contractor's response was not
stupid but was a reasonable response to a poorly described
requirement. [Ref. 11]
The Defense Science Board looked at military specifica-
tions and standards in the mid-70 's. Their report was
delivered to the Pentagon in January 1977. It stated that
DoD specifications and standards:
1. Are essential to technical procurement
2
.
Are . . . as a body . . . adequate
3. Provide lessons learned
4 Serve as primers for the inexperienced
5. Help assure quality products.
However they:
1. Include cost drivers . . . primarily non product . . .
those concerning general design requirements, documen-
tation and management
2 Refer to other documents . . . many of which should
not be contractual
.
Therefore, what is needed is to:
1. Improve the specifications and standards themselves
2. Improve application of specifications and standards.
[Ref. 9]
C. CURRENT ISSUES
Dr. Richard Stimson is the OSD point of contact for
streamlining, and the Director of the Industrial Productivi-
ty Office in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
20
Defense (Acquisition & Logistics) . He expressed his
disappointment in a June 1985 Government Executive article
over the difference between what the Defense Science Board
had recommended and what had actually been accomplished in
the nine years since the report was issued as evidenced by
the current problems. [Ref. 12]
One of the examples his office uncovered in their
research, "the requirements package for a single electronic
'black box' added up to 2,000 specifications, made a piled-
up stack eight feet high." [Ref. 12]
1. Growth of Specifications
Specifications and standards have grown from 40,300
in 1968 to 32,900 in 1978 to 45,800 in 1982. Externally
imposed management procedures have managed to keep pace with
them, as they have grown from 30 in 1968 to 600 in 1978 to
900 in 1982. [Ref. 9]
There is even a 22 page specification for a mouse-
trap [Ref. 12] as well as a 14 page specification establish-
ed for fruitcake. Senator Sam Nunn was responsible for
reading a 14 page MIL Standard on fruitcake into the
Congressional Record . The latest revision raised the
tolerances for candied cherries. [Ref. 13]
2
.
Overspecification
A comparison of DoD and commercial requirements
makes an interesting contrast, as can be seen in Figure 2.
The total number of documents for the DoD program is 11,000
21
COMPARISON OF DoD AND COMMERCIAL REQUIREMENTS
FSO CONTRACTUAL
REQUIREMENTS DoD COMMERCIAL
20
20 1
210 9
300
PROGRAM PLANS
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
OTHER THAN MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
SPECIFICATIONS
0ATA ITEM DESCRIPTIONS
DOCUMENTS - ORIGINAL CALLOUT SSO 10
TOTAL DOCUMENTS - INCLUDING TWO TIERS
OF REFERENCED DOCUMENTS 11000 SO
PAGES OF SYSTEM PECULIAR SPECS 16.000 400
FSD PAPERWORK CONSEQUENCES
CONTRACTUAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES 2.000 AM
SEPARATE DATA SUBMITTALS M 000 250
Source: [Ref. 9]
Figure 2. Comparison of DoD and Commercial Requirements
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documents as compared to 50 documents for the commercial
program. [Ref. 9]
The typical military program,
specifies 30 how-to-manage plans, 300 military specifica-
tions and standards. The latter, in turn, reference
12,000 other specs/standards just in the first two
tiers below that top of the paper pyramid, and 400 data
items. [Ref. 12]
3
.
Tiering of Specifications
The tiering of specifications, or pyramid effect,
wherein each specification references more specifications,
is another large problem area. The problem is compounded by
incorporating all the specification and references into the
contract as requirements. For example, Figure 3 shows four
specifications with 143 second tier specifications and over
4,000 in the third tier. [Ref. 14]
4 Unnecessary Requirements
The first draft of an RFP for the Advanced Medium
Short Take-Off and Landing Transport (AMST) contained a
number of unnecessary requirements, as can be seen in Figure
4. While the specification for curled animal hair, paper
grocers 1 bags, and packaging and packing of thread might be
interesting, they have little to do with aircraft
requirements
.
5. Aaed Specifications
Specifications and requirements are in many ways the
"corporate memory" of the Department of Defense and were
23
Example: The Spec
Snowball
1ST TIER 2ND TIER 3RD TIER
MIL-P-9024 (PKG/HANDUNG/TRANSP)
MIL-S-8512 (GENERAL S.E. SPEC)
MIL-STD-490 (SPEC PRACTICES)
MIL-STD-1561 (PROVISIONING)
50 1.009
75 3,111
10 112
8 38
143 4,270
Source: [Ref. 14]
Figure 3. The Spec Snowball
Why Tailor unnecessary
Requirements?
FED SPEC PPP-C-0020 STEEL FILING CABINETS
FED SPEC UU-B-36 PAPER GROCERS BAGS
FED SPEC PPP-P-50 PACKAGING AND PACKING OF THREAD
FED SPEC C-H-111 CURLED ANIMAL HAIR
FED SPEC UU-P-271 DRAFT WRAPPING PAPER
MIL-STD-758A PACKAGING^PROCEDURES FOR
SUBMARINE REPAIR PARTS
Source: [Ref. 14]
Figure 4. Why Tailor Unnecessary Requirements
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created to solve or preclude problems. However, many of
them contain, or reference, dated information or processes.
For example, MIL-E-5400, which is the general speci-
fication for aerospace electronic equipment, contains 255
first tier references and 1,374 second tier references [Ref.
15] . The average age of the documents is 11+ years, as can
be seen in Figure 5. In an industry such as the electronic
industry, where time is measured in generations of equipment
rather than years, this places the specifications at least
one, or possibly more, generations behind the current state
of the art.
What this means to DoD is that the components or
equipment being procured is more than likely not available
in the marketplace. Therefore, contractors must conduct
special production runs to meet the needs of the DoD. This
amounts to more cost and higher prices for equipment or
components which are by industry's standards, obsolete
technology.
Additionally, if a contractor attempts to manufac-
ture equipment according to aged specifications, he may
experience difficulty in conformance. If the contractor
does not conform to the aged or out-dated specification, he
stands the risk of not passing the quality inspections.
For example, Mr. John P. Leslie, Manager, Quality
and Reliability Assurance, Texas Instruments, briefed the
DoD Streamlining Advocates on March 15, 1985, about a
25
MIL-E-5400 AGING ANALYSIS
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Source: [Ref. 15]
Figure 5. MIL-E-5400 Aging Analysis
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problem his company had experienced with MIL-E-5400. [Ref.
15]
MIL-E-5400 references MIL-A-8625C, which is con-
cerned with anodic coatings for aluminum and aluminum
alloys. MIL-A-8625C was issued on January 15, 1968, and
last amended on March 14, 1969.
Under MIL-E-5400 3.13 Workmanship , it states, "The
anodic coating shall be continuous, smooth, adherent, uni-
form in appearance." The difficulty is that many of Texas
Instruments' aluminum parts are castings which receive
anodic coating in accordance with MIL-A-8625C. Production
was halted because the coated casings were not "uniform in
appearance.
"
Texas Instruments contacted the Naval Engineering
Center, custodian for MIL-A-862 5. They said that, "MIL-A-
8 62 5 was written around wrought alloys, castings were never
considered," but that they were committed to review the
specification for possible update. [Ref. 15]
Texas Instruments next contacted the Superintendent
of Navy Aero Materials Division, who stated, "The require-
ment for uniform color of dyed coatings is based on the
behavior of wrought alloys and is considered too restrictive
for most casting alloys." [Ref. 15]
Next, Texas Instruments contacted ALCOA, the
developer and patentee of the anodic coating process, who
said,
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. . . dye bleedout is not uncommon with castings, the
anodic coating has uniform coverage, only the dye (color)
is affected by the bleedout and in no way affects the
integrity of the coating. [Ref. 15]
After local discussions, three letters, and three
months of research it was agreed that discoloration due to
dye bleedout on castings is acceptable. The MIL Spec
requirements has not been changed . [Ref. 15]
D. SUMMARY
Dr. Stimson, in the June Government Executive article,
stated that Defense has more than 40,000 standards and
specifications, and
When you snow somebody with all that, they simply won't
read it. If they did, they would find (in terms of a
specific systems development) a lot of incomplete, contra-
dictory requirements. In fact, very few people examine
the details of all those possible applications to see if
they're relevant. And, of course, you throw a stack like
that at a small business, you simply scare him away from
bidding at all. [Ref. 12]
DoD-HBDK-248A states that the more than 4 0,000
specifications and standards currently utilized by DoD have
the potential to cause problems in terms of over-specified
requirements, ambiguous wording, obsolete paragraphs and
overlapping requirements which may or may not be compatible
with one another. [Ref. 1]
As a result, 100% compliance to requirements repre-
sents a major challenge to industry, and may not be the most
cost effective or efficient means of acquiring material for
the Department of Defense.
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IV. ACQUISITION STREAMLINING
A. INTRODUCTION
Acquisition streamlining, as defined by the Department
of Defense Directive 5000.43, involves taking action to pre-
clude or eliminate non-cost-effective requirements in
design, development and production. This can be accom-
plished in any one of (or combination of) four ways:
1. Specify requirements in terms of the results desired
(performance specifications) rather than "how-to-
produce" (design specifications)
.
2. Preclude premature application of design solutions,
specifications, and standards.
3
.
Tailor the contract requirements to fit the unique
circumstances of each acquisition program.
4. Limit the contractual applicability of referenced
documents to only those that are essential.
The purpose of acquisition streamlining is to promote
actions which result in innovative and cost-effective
requirements and strategies, which in turn will lead to
higher quality weapon systems or products.
Acquisition streamlining is based on the concept that by
applying pertinent contract requirements and allowing
early industry involvement in recommending the most cost
effective solutions, the Department of Defense can reduce
the acquisition cost, life cycle cost, and/or time of
system acquisition without degrading system effectiveness.
[Ref. 3]
The concept of streamlining may be applied to the entire
acquisition process, and as will be seen, has numerous
interpretations, which is the intent of DoD Directive
29
5000.43 as it cites the purpose of acquisition streamlining
to be "to promote innovative and cost-effective acquisition
requirements and acquisition strategies." [Ref. 3]
B. BACKGROUND
Acquisition streamlining is not a new concept. It has
been discussed and debated in the literature for at least a
decade. The Defense Science Board reported in 1977 that DoD
specifications and standards: are essential to technical
procurement; provide lessons learned; serve as primers for
the inexperienced; and help assure quality products but that
they also include "cost drivers" which are primarily non-
product such as general design requirements, documentation
and management. It recommended that, in addition to improv-
ing the specifications and standards themselves, the actual
process by which the specifications and standards are
applied needs improvement. [Ref. 3]
Acquisition streamlining is similar to other prior
initiatives in that it is designed to reform the acquisition
process. What is different, though, is the widespread
support and commitment from both the DoD and private indus-
try the streamlining concept appears to have. Based on the
numerous studies, programs and initiatives, the support and
interest has been slow in building.
President Reagan took office with the professed goals of
rebuilding the American economy and the American armed
forces. As the economy was in poor shape and the Department
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of Defense was perceived by both the American public and
Congress as wasteful, the cornerstone of the rearming of the
armed forces was to make the acquisition process more
efficient. [Ref. 16]
In order to accomplish this, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, Frank C. Carlucci chartered five working groups on
March 2, 1981, to review the entire defense acquisition
process and make recommendations for improvements [Ref. 17]
His goals were to rebuild the basic defense industrial base
while simultaneously outfitting the military to meet the
perceived growing Soviet threat [Ref. 16]. The results of
the study were compiled into a document formally titled,
"The Defense Acquisition Improvement Program" which even-
tually came to be known as the Carlucci Initiatives.
The first 31 Carlucci Initiatives were published on
April 30, 1981. Carlucci Initiative number 14, entitled
"Reduce Number of DoD Directives and Eliminate Non-Cost-
Effective Contract Requirements," focused on acquisition
streamlining. [Ref. 17]
A team which was composed of members of the Department
of Defense, the National Security Industrial Association and
the Aerospace Industries Association was assembled and
requested to review 13 2 acquisition-related DoD directives
and regulations, in view of initiative number 14. In addi-
tion to recommending that 31 of the 132 acquisition direc-
tives be cancelled, they also focused on reducing
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non-cost-effective contract requirements and documentation.
[Ref. 17] Much of the current emphasis on acquisition
streamlining is largely an outgrowth of their actions.
On 12 January 1983, Mr. Paul Thayer became Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense, inheriting the Acquisition Improvement Pro-
gram and the Carlucci Initiatives. He announced his six
"Consolidated Acquisition Improvement Program Initiatives,"
a composite of twelve of the original 32 Carlucci Initia-
tives on May 5, 1983. [Ref. 17]
The Second Year-End Report was issued on June 6, 1983,
by Mr. Thayer under the guise of a memorandum entitled,
"Guidance on the Acquisition Improvement Program (AIP) . " It
was a summary of the progress made during the first two
years of the program and explained further why the 32
initiatives had been reduced to 6. The report characterized
13 of the initiatives as having been fully implemented, nine
being in process, and the remaining ten requiring further
action. [Ref. 17]
Based on the guidance supplied in the Second Year-End
Report , a number of initiatives which were characterized as
being "completed" or "on track" were not selected to be
emphasized by Mr. Thayer, and therefore were not specifi-
cally enumerated in his six consolidated initiatives.
Carlucci Initiative number 14, which dealt with the reduc-
tion in the number of DoD directives, was not included in
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the six consolidated initiatives, which characterized it as
being "on track" or "complete."
On January 11, 1984, Mr. Thayer issued a memorandum to
the secretaries of the military departments on the subject
of improving contract requirements. In this memorandum he
cites the recommendations made under the Acquisition
Improvement Program Initiative #14 by the review team and
the Defense Science Board. The recommendations called for
precluding untimely, untailored and accidentally-
referenced application of specifications and standards and
for specifying results required rather than detailed 'how
to' procedures in contracts and requests for proposals."
[Ref. 18]
Mr. Thayer also requested each service designate two or
more new major systems acquisitions as pilot programs, and
two or more programs currently in demonstration/validation
or full-scale development phases for a post-award review to
eliminate non-cost-effective contract requirements. Twelve
programs were selected, four from each of the Army, Navy and
Air Force (see Figure 6)
.
William H. Taft IV replaced Mr. Thayer in 1984 as the
Deputy Secretary of Defense. Shortly after taking office,
he released the third annual report on the Acquisition
Improvement Initiatives. In the report he voiced his
concern that without the proper priority attention the
momentum behind the initiative would be lost.
On November 4, 1984, Mr. Taft issues a memorandum
expressing his concerns about non-cost-effective
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Source: [Ref. 9]
Figure 6. Initial Programs Selected
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requirements (particularly for fielded weapon systems) which
had resulted in high costs to the Department of Defense. In
the memorandum he charged the services to "assess the extent
of the problem and its causes, identify solutions already in
place, and develop additional proposals, including areas
where increased emphasis may be required." [Ref. 2]
Mr. Taft also stated that "ultimately" over-specified
and non-cost-effective requirements should be challenged as
an integral part of the acquisition process [Ref. 2].
In a memorandum dated December 4, 1984, Mr. Taft identi-
fied as the point of contact for the Office of Secretary of
Defense, Mr. Peter Yurcisin, the Director of Standardization
and Acquisition Support. Mr. Taft also attached a prelimin-
ary assessment which had been developed in response to the
November memorandum, and directed the military services and
the Defense Logistics Agency to develop management plans to
implement the proposals cited in the preliminary assessment.
[Ref. 19]
The preliminary assessment described the extent of the
problem as "undefinable" because there are more than 40,000
military standards and specifications currently utilized by
the Department of Defense which have the potential to cause
problems in terms of over-specified requirements, ambiguous
wording, obsolete paragraphs and overlapping requirements
which may or may not be compatible with one another. Addi-
tionally, there are literally millions of contractor
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generated drawings, which the government has acquired which
also may contain the same over-specified requirements.
These specifications and requirements are in many ways
the "corporate memory" of the Department of Defense and were
created to solve or preclude problems. However, many of
them contain, or reference, dated information or processes.
This is part of the problem which was identified in Mr.
Taft's memorandum. Other causes of the problem identified
were:
1. Overly conservative design approach to design
engineering.
2. The failure to challenge requirements during design
and development.
3
.
The purchase of equipment by using drawings which are
obsolete and outdated.
4 The lack of adequate resources for those groups tasked
with material reviews.
5. Over-specification due to a lack of adequate technical
data. [Ref. 19]
In the same preliminary assessment, Mr. Taft identified
several areas which he termed, "areas of increased emphasis"
and "additional proposals." These were areas in which he
believed that action could be taken. Some of the areas he
cited were: an increased emphasis in awareness for the
program managers in technical and cost reasonableness,
increased support for standardization programs to review and
challenge requirements in specifications and standards, con-
ducting of value engineering throughout the life cycle of a
weapon system program and finally, the integration of
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efforts among the services and a point of contact within
each service for this effort. Also, the memorandum stated
that the effort should be in consonance with the ongoing
long range Acquisition Initiative number 14. [Ref. 19]
The following day another memorandum was issued by Mr.
Taft. The subject of the memorandum of December 5, 1984,
was "elimination" rather than "reduction" of non-cost-
effective contract requirements, and it accelerated and re-
emphasized the program by requesting that each service
designate a flag officer (or equivalent Senior Executive
Service)
,
not as a point of contact, but rather as an
"advocate" by December 15, 1984. [Ref. 20]
Dr. Richard A. Stimson was designated as the focal point
for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) , and he was
assigned to work with each military department "advocate" in
order to finalize the DoD guidance on the "streamlining
initiative." [Ref. 20]
It is significant that this is the first reference in
the literature to this effort as the "streamlining initia-
tive." Prior to this point it was known as Acquisition
Improvement Initiative number 14, or the effort to reduce
non-cost-effective contract requirements. With the increas-
ed emphasis placed on the initiative by designating service
advocates and requiring periodic status reports on implemen-
tation progress, the streamlining initiative gained support
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and began to accelerate, both within the services and within
private industry.
Mr. Taft also stated in the December 5, 1984 memorandum
that he fully supported the initiative and would like to see
it "institutionalized in major systems acquisitions." [Ref.
20]
There was a shift in emphasis from the memorandum of
December 4, 1984, to the memorandum of December 5, 1984—
a
movement from focusing on short-term "reduction" in non-
cost-effective contract requirements to a long-term
"elimination" approach.
On December 6, 1984, Mr. Taft made the announcement that
streamlining would be one of the top initiatives during this
administration. The emphasis within the Office of the
Secretary of Defense would be placed on working with the
service advocates in expanding the number of programs
targeted for streamlining, finalizing the policy and
guidance for the Department of Defense, developing a means
of measuring effective streamlining implementation and coor-
dinating both a training program and a program designed to
incentivize DoD personnel. [Ref. 21]
The streamlining initiative was given new impetus with
the announcement of the three military service advocates in
January 1985. They were:
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Army: Mr. Roy D. Greene
Navy: Mr. Gerard C. Hoffmann
Air Force: Colonel James J. Lindenfelser
The advocates met together with Dr. Richard Stimson on
February 25, 1985, and submitted their first report to Mr.
Taft on March 5, 1985 [Ref. 21]. Instead of the original 12
programs targeted for streamlining, the number had been
expanded to 3 3 (the programs are listed in Figure 7)
.
Throughout 1985, the subject of streamlining was well
publicized as it was discussed both in the trade literature,
and at numerous conferences. It is interesting that indi-
viduals from private industry such as Mr. Brent Hardesty,
the corporate director, Technical Management Systems, McDon-
nell Douglas Corporation, were very outspoken on the subject
of streamlining.
Mr. Hardesty also chaired the Council of Defense and
Space Industry Associations (CODSIA) Task Group 23-83, a
group outspoken in defense of the streamlining initiative.
He has been directly concerned with the streamlining initia-
tive since 1983, and defines streamlining as "taking actions
which result in reduction or more effective use of the cost
or time to develop and produce quality products." [Ref. 9]
He states that in order for streamlining to take place,
there must first be a "change in attitudes" so that we can
"reduce to a minimum" and "make simpler or more efficient"
the acquisition process. [Ref. 21]
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PROGRAMS TARGETED FOR STREAMLINING
ARMY
EXPERIMENTAL LIGHT HELICOPTER
ADVANCED ANTI-TANK WEAPON SYSTEM
FAMILY OF MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLES
JOINT TACTICAL MISSILE SYSTEM
LIGHT-WEIGHT AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM
ARMORED GUNSYSTEM
NAVY
UNDERGRADUATE JET FLIGHT TRAINING SYSTEM (T-45)
JOINT SERVICES ADVANCED VERTICAL LIFT AIRCRAFT PROGRAM (V-22)
REPLACEMENT INNER ZONE AIR ASW VEHICLE (CVIZ HELO)
AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIP (MULTIPURPOSE)
AE36 (AMMUNITION SHIP)
PATROL COMBATANT MULTI-MISSION SHIP
ADVANCED TACTICAL AIRCRAFT
WORLDWIDE INFO SYSTEM (WIS) MODERNIZATION
AFLOAT CORRELATION PROGRAM
EHFSATCOM TERMINALS
RELOCATABLE OVERTHE HORIZON RADAR
SHIP LAUNCHED ELECTRONIC DECOY
RP3D RESEARCH AIRCRAFT
VH-60 PRESIDENTIAL HELICOPTER
AIR FORCE
ADVANCED TACTICAL FIGHTER
INTEGRATED ELECTRONIC WARFARE SYSTEM
WORLDWIDE INFO SYSTEM (WIS) MODERNIZATION
ADVANCED MEDIUM RANGE AIR-TO-AIR MlSSiLE PRODUCTION PROGRAM
ADVANCED TACTICAL FIGHTER ENGINE
PEACEKEEPER ICBM PROGRAM
ACCELERATEDSMALL ICBM PROGRAM
MILSTAR
LOCALON-LINE NETWORKING SYSTEM
JOINT SURVEILLANCE TARGET ATTACK RADAR SYSTEM
ANTI-RADIATION MISSILE DECOY
TITAN T34D7 SPACE BOOSTER
AIR FORCE MINI-COMPUTER USER SYSTEM
Source: [Ref. 22]
Figure 7. Programs Targeted For Streamlining
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Mr. Taft issued a clarifying memorandum on "Acquisition
Streamlining" on June 3, 1985, in which he states that one
of the goals of acquisition streamlining is to ensure that
"contract requirements result from intent and not accident."
[Ref. 23] He cites the failure to place a limit on the con-
tractual applicability of documents referenced in specifica-
tions and standards as a "leading" contributor to the
accidental incorporation of unnecessary or counterproductive
contract requirements.
Mr. Taft goes on further to say that it is DoD policy to
avoid the "premature" application of military specifications
and standards and to limit indirect referencing of contract
requirements. He also details procedures to be followed in
order to implement this policy:
• In the beginning of a program specify requirements in
terms of performance.
• Prior to full-scale development, specifications and
standards are to be cited for guidance only.
• For full-scale development contracts, the contractual
applicability of specifications and standards will be
limited to those specifically cited in the contract.
The second-tier and below documents will be for guidance
only.
• Streamlining should continue throughout the production
phase, ensuring that only essential requirements are
carried forward.
• If using non-developmental items, all specifications and
standards which define the production baseline for those
items are contractually applicable. [Ref. 23]
Mr. Taft also states, in the memorandum, that contrac-
tors are required to provide recommendations for
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applications and tailoring of specifications, standards and
requirements during one phase for application to the next.
He designates the program manager as the individual with the
authority to make the final decision as to which contract
requirements should apply, and cites DoD Directive 4245.7,
"Transition from Development to Production," as a basis for
"resolving risk and ensuring development of a fully-
integrated, producible and supportable system." This policy
was given an implementation date of September 30, 1985.
[Ref. 23]
The month of June 1985 was a busy one for those involved
with the initiative. In addition to the Taft memo there
were several articles in Government Executive , and numerous
talks given on the subject. One of the common threads which
appeared in all the article and speeches given were the
topics of quality and cost reduction.
An article in the June issue of Government Executive .
"Defense to 'Tailor' Specs and Standards To Get Systems
Quality Up, Costs Down," cites the objective of streamlining
as being "twin goals" of improving weapon system quality and
reducing acquisition costs [Ref. 12]. Another article, in
the same issue, "Building Quality Into Our Defense," states
that quality is absolutely essential to not only the
nation's defense, but to American industry [Ref. 24],
One of the presentations at the Second National Confer-
ence and Workshop in June, sponsored by The Institute of
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Environmental Sciences, was delivered by VADM Busey
(Commander, Naval Air Systems Command or COMNAVAIRSYSCOM)
[Ref. 25]. As three of the initial four Navy programs
targeted for streamlining were aviation-oriented,
NAVAIRSYSCOM assumed a leadership role in streamlining for
the Navy and at the conference VADM Busey discussed some of
the actions being taken. Also, he described the guidance he
had issued to his four program managers:
1. Educate technical personnel on the tailoring process
to ensure that specification requirements are opti-
mized in consonance with operational needs and include
only essential procedures;
2. Determine the appropriate level of specification
application and carefully limit references to avoid
unnecessary chaining.
3
.
Increase contractor involvement in the tailoring proc-
ess by encouraging contractors to propose specifica-
tion waivers and deviations as well as allowing
maximum use of contractor procedures and data
products. [Ref. 25]
VADM Busey also addressed the establishment of an execu-
tive level specification aggressor team which he tasked with
ensuring that the engineers are tailoring the specifications
under their cognizance adequately and properly.
He went on further to describe some of the difficulties
which must be overcome in order to make streamlining work:
1. Time is a scarce resource for government engineers,
especially during the early phases of the program,
which is when tailoring is most effective.
2. There is a tendency to be conservative as specifica-
tions were written largely as a result of lessons
learned.
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3.
Contractors are reluctant to propose changes for fear
of being found non-responsive.
4. Government policies on competition make it difficult
to involve contractors in the tailoring process. Con-
tractors are also cautious about divulging information
to their competitors. [Ref. 25]
VADM Busey also pointed out to the conference attendees
that the streamlining initiative was not only concerned with
equipment and systems in terms of affordability but also in
terms of reliability and quality. He stated that since
specifications are primarily intended to ensure quality and
uniformity, the judicious use of warranties and guarantees
will provide the same benefits while permitting greatly
increased design flexibility. [Ref. 25]
Throughout the remainder of 1985 the momentum behind
streamlining continued. The Council of Defense and Space
Industry Associations (CODSIA) wrote Mr. Taft on October 15,
1985, stating that, "of the several hundred companies which
received the draft, not one objected to the Initiative, its
concepts, nor its policies." [Ref. 26] They did suggest
that without compatible regulations implementation would be
difficult.
The DoD Directive 5000.43, "Acquisition Streamlining"
was issued on January 15, 1986, while the Second National
Conference on Acquisition Streamlining was being held. In
the memorandum dated the same date, Mr. Taft noted that
"cultural change" will be necessary in order to implement
the policies contained in the new directive, and that
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streamlining is designed to integrate affordability more
fully into the acquisition process. [Ref. 27]
Mr. Taft reiterated his commitment to quality while
addressing the streamlining conference.
The single most important initiative we will pursue in the
future will be to extend our concentration on quality.
The DoD/Industry Quality Excellence Program, which
includes Acquisition Streamlining . . . expresses our
commitment to continuous quality improvement. [Ref. 28]
Streamlining, as it appears in DoDD 5000.43, has been
employed successfully by the U.S. Navy with the T-45
Training System. The U.S. Army has adopted a slightly
larger view of streamlining and is involved in streamlining
its entire acquisition process.
Both applications of the streamlining concept, the
Army's and the Navy's, will be explored further in this
discussion.
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V. T-4 5TS TRAINING SYSTEM
A. INTRODUCTION
The objective of acquisition streamlining is to reduce
the cost and the time it takes to acquire a weapon system
while still maintaining or improving the quality of the
product. The primary actions are to eliminate from solici-
tations and contracts such counterproductive requirements
as:
• how to manage requirements (e.g. , externally imposed
management systems)
• premature requirements (e.g., design solutions before
development begins)
• untailored requirements (e.g., over-specification)
• accidentally referenced requirements (e.g., unlimited
pyramidal referencing)
.
One of the initial programs targeted for streamlining
within the U.S. Navy is the T-45 Training System. In order
to reach the affordability goal imposed upon the program,
the T-45TS program manager reduced development costs from
$810 million, in 1981, to $438 million, in 1985. This was
accomplished by thoroughly scrubbing each requirement, and
attacking the cost driver specifications and standards.
What follows is a brief description of the T-45TS
program, what it consists of, its background and problems
and how they were overcome.
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B. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION
The T-45TS is a comprehensive, integrated jet flight
training system for intermediate flight training of Navy and
Marine pilots. It is a derivative of a British land-based
Hawk system which is currently being flown by the Royal Air
Force as well as other countries. The T-45TS has been
restructured for use by the American Navy to include air-
craft carrier capability.
The T-45 Training system will be used to train approxi-
mately 600 undergraduate, carrier-based jet aviators for the
U.S. Navy per year. The initial operational capability
(IOC) is scheduled for 1990. The 1990 IOC is crucial to
maintain required training as the inventories of the T-2 and
TA-4 aircraft begin to diminish. The T-45TS is projected to
be utilized for required jet pilot training through the year
2015. [Ref. 29]
The T-45TS is a total system, consisting of five major
elements, not just an aircraft. It includes 3 00 fixed-wing
aircraft, an associated ground-training subsystem (GTS) and
the logistics support capability for both. The ground-
training subsystem consists of a package of 32 instrument
and operational flight simulators, and 49 computer-based
training integration systems which will be used to track and
schedule the progress of the student pilots and manage the
training program assets. [Ref. 29]
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In order to make the T-4 5A capable of landing and taking
off from aircraft carriers, a number of changes had to be
made to the British Hawk design (Figure 8)
.
Moving aft from the aircraft nose: A steerable nose wheel
with a catapult launch bar will be installed; strengthened
nose and main landing gear will be designed to withstand
the higher sink rates experienced in carrier operations;
at the rear an arresting hook will be added to allow the
aircraft to be recovered on carrier decks; between the
nose wheel and hook, the fuselage structure will be
strengthened to accommodate stresses in catapulting and
arresting the aircraft. These changes, collectively,
provide carrier suitability. [Ref. 29]
C. THE ACQUISITION STRATEGY
The acquisition strategy for the T-45TS is based on the
fact that the Navy is not just purchasing a derivative
development aircraft, it is purchasing a fully integrated
system for both intermediate and advanced training of Navy
and Marine Corps pilots. The T-45TS is scheduled to replace
existing T-2 and TA-4 aircraft, simulators, and associated
equipment.
The derivative development approach reduces the amount
of new technology required. It also provides the maximum
benefit from "lessons learned" from British Aerospace in
their production experience with the HAWK aircraft, from
previous simulator experience, from proven computer-aided
instructional devices and from the British Royal Air Force's
experience in logistical support of the HAWK.
In addition, the acquisition strategy calls for the con-
tract type to be a firm, fixed price development contract
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Source: [Ref. 29]
Figure 8. T-45A Design Differences
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with firm fixed price options for low rate initial produc-
tion of aircraft and associated simulators.
There are four major contractors involved with the
program. The prime contractor, McDonnell Douglas, has
established teaming arrangements with British Aerospace,
Rolls Royce and Sperry Electronic Systems.
McDonnell Douglas is responsible for system integration,
in addition to being a joint developer with British Aero-
space of the T-45A fixed wing aircraft. Rolls Royce is to
provide the MK861 Adour engine; Sperry is the subcontractor
for the instrument and operational flight simulators.
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics is responsible for the
development of the computer-assisted instruction (CAI) and
the training integration system (TIS) . [Ref . 29]
The T-45TS system will be supported by contractor
maintenance. This is in line with the current policy of the
Naval Air Training Command, which supports contractor main-
tenance for non-deployable aircraft as opposed to organic
maintenance as a means of lowering life-cycle costs. The
initial contract also includes all resources which the
contractor will need to initially support the aircraft, such
as all repair parts, support equipment publications and
manuals. In addition the contractor has been tasked to pro-
vide the Navy with the necessary data in order to complete
the support contract in the outyears. This will provide the
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Navy with sufficient technical information so as to permit
contracting flexibility. [Ref. 29]
D. PROGRAM MILESTONES
Technical studies which were conducted in 1978, and
alternative systems exploration which were conducted in
1980, indicated that a single airplane could be used for
both the intermediate and advance training, and that procur-
ing an integrated system was more economical than procuring
just an aircraft [Ref. 30].
In November 1981, the source selection process was con-
cluded with the selection of McDonnell Douglas Aircraft
Company. However, full scale engineering development was
not begun until October 2, 1984 (see Figure 9).
The first flight of the T-45 is scheduled for December
1987, followed by pilot production in 1989. Full production
will commence in 1991 and will continue through the 1990' s.
The strategy calls for a total of 3 00 aircraft to be
produced. [Ref. 30]
E
.
BACKGROUND
In 1981, the program was first estimated to cost $810
million. However, the initial requirements were reviewed
and redefined so as to contract only for those essential
hardware items. There was recognition within the T-45TS
program office that a new trainer was not top priority
within the Navy budget process. [Ref. 29] Therefore, a
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Figure 9. T-45TS Program Milestones
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decision was made to make the acquisition process as
economical as possible. This would, it was felt, improve
its chances for continued funding.
In order to accomplish this, during the
demonstration/validation phase a number of items were
deleted, such as an aerial demonstration trainer, head-up
and multimedia displays and an airborne computer. This
reduced the estimated cost of development from $810 million
to $727 million. [Ref. 29]
Other actions which were taken to reduce the costs were
a switch from organic (in-house) logistic support to
contractor maintenance, and a limitation on the level of
military specifications which would be applicable. This
latter action is one of the most significant areas of
streamlining. By restricting the referencing of
specifications to the second tier, with the exception of
those involving operational safety, a potentially large
number of specifications were eliminated, thereby reducing
costs and unnecessary detail.
The T-45TS program was designated by the Under Secretary
of the Navy on April 6, 1984, to serve as an initial
participant in the drive to reduce contract requirements
under the Acquisition Improvement Program Initiative number
14 [Ref. 9]. On the 10th of April 1984, the Chief of Naval
Material requested COMNAVAIR to take the lead in implement-
ing the initiatives, as three of the four Navy programs
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designated were aviation related. [Ref. 30] A DoD workshop
was held in the latter part of May 1984 to discuss these
concepts.
Also in May of 1984, the T-45TS program was reviewed by
the Navy Systems Acquisition Review Council and the Secre-
tary of the Navy and a determination was made that, while
the strategy was sound, the program was not affordable at
$727 million. The T-45TS program office received guidance
to reduce the development costs to $450 million beginning in
fiscal year 1985. [Ref. 29] It was at this point in time
that the contract type was changed from cost plus to firm
fixed price.
Basically, the program manager was faced with three
goals: to achieve the necessary cost savings/cost avoidance
wherever possible, restructure the program, and maintain the
technical quality and operational performance of the T-45TS.
F. THE TIGER TEAM
The response by the T-45TS program office was to
organize a joint Naval Air Systems/Douglas Aircraft Company
Tiger Team who was given the mission of making the program
affordable, i.e., development costs equal to $450 million.
[Ref. 29]
It was recognized by the program office that coordina-
tion and planning were going to be two critical elements of
the restructuring effort, as the program developed by the
Tiger Team would have to be approved by both the Navy and
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the top management of Douglas Aircraft Company. A rigorous
schedule was established which was used to track the
progress and to establish a target date for the signing of
the letter contract by October 1, 1984 (see Figure 10)
.
The program manager, as the one individual responsible
for the overall operation, had a two-fold responsibility for
the Tiger Team; he ensured that while the Tiger Team
received constructive inputs from those outside the team,
they were also shielded from disruptive inputs.
The actual formation of the Tiger Team was crucial not
only because of the composition of the team, but because of
the atmosphere and attitudes created. It was as essential
to assign the right personnel to the right positions as it
was to ensure everyone was committed to the team goals in
order to accomplish the rather ambitious schedule
established for the restructuring effort. It was important
that the team became, as much as possible, an integrated
whole, willing to work for team goals rather than individual
agendas.
The Tiger Team was the responsibility of the program
manager, but the day-to-day management of the team was left
to the Navy deputy program manager and the Douglas program
manager. The actual responsibilities of the Tiger Team are
shown in Figure 11. In each of the three critical
functional areas shown at the bottom of Figure 11, Navy
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engineers and logisticians worked closely with their
counterparts from private industry.
The cost of the program was tracked by a contract
strategy team who also ensured that the contract language
was modified appropriately. Other teams monitored the
systems integration to ensure that nothing was being lost
and that the end product would continue to be an integrated
and balanced program.
The full team met four times, initially for two weeks
than three more times for a week each time. In between
times, the individual committees met, worked, and kept in
touch with one another through extensive use of electronic
communications. [Ref. 29]
The Tiger Team was charged to:
streamline specifications and standards by determining
minimum essential technical requirements without sacrific-
ing material needs and particularly to isolate essential
performance requirements from detailed design
specifications. [Ref. 31]
Prior to the formation of the Tiger Team, in April 1984,
the Request For Quotation (RFQ) for full-scale engineering
development was released. Though the program office was
intending to award the contract as a firm-fixed price con-
tract, the Request For Quotation was released on a cost-
plus-fixed-fee basis. This was done intentionally as the
Request For Quotation was to be used as the baseline, or
straw man, for the restructured contract.
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The straw man was constructed by a joint Navy/contractor
effort and it consisted of four parts: specifications,
statement of work, contract data requirements, and contract
terms and conditions.
As nearly 80% of the overall system cost was in the T-
4 5A aircraft, the team focused on the design or detailed
specifications. The T-45A aircraft detail specification
"defines all the operational characteristics of the aircraft
and its subsystems, as well as proven practices that are to
be applied in the design, manufacture, and support of the
aircraft." [Ref. 31] The specifications and standards
committee of the Tiger Team utilized a draft copy of DoD
Handbook 248B, "Optimizing Contractual Requirements for Cost
Effective Application in Defense Contracts," in developing
their strategies to streamline the program.
First they focused on limiting the referencing of speci-
fications to the second tier, with the exception of opera-
tional safety. In the government, the aircraft
specification document is known as the detailed or design
specification. The tier below that document comprises
documents referenced therein, mostly military specifications
and standards; the second tier of specifications, therefore,
comprises documents referenced in the first tier, etc. As
the tiering of specifications for the T-45TS was terminated
at the second tier, this meant that all the essential
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requirements were cited in the contract, while the non-
essential were either dropped or cited for guidance only.
Closely associated with the streamlining action of the
specifications and standards was an effort to reduce the
number of contract data requirements. This government call
for data is known as the Contract Data Requirements List
(CDRL) . The two data managers from both the government and
the contractor were tasked with reducing the number of items
on that list, in view of the on-going streamlining effort.
They utilized several strategies in order to accomplish the
task: [Ref. 31]
1. Utilize existing data. There was a great deal of
British documentation available, which had only to be
"Americanized" for those areas which the British Hawk
and the American T-45A would have in common. This was
not quite as simple as it sounds, as it meant recon-
ciling different engineering philosophies, drawings
and practices.
2. Combine common data requirements specified at the sub-
system level into a single "system" data deliverable
in one document.
3. Eliminate unnecessary or non-essential requirements,
the so-called "gold-plating" of contracts. This would
limit the data requirements to only those essential
program requirements.
4
.
Permit the use of contractor format for the prepara-
tion of data. The format of the data was unimportant,
as long as the content was complete.
By constructing the straw man both the Navy and the
contractor personnel achieved a good understanding of what
the baseline consisted of, the associated costs for major
elements of the work breakdown structure (WBS)
.
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One of the most widely used and accepted methods for
achieving an acceptable or suitable baseline is the work
breakdown structure, which was the method chosen by the T-
45TS program office.
The work breakdown structure provides a technique to
systematically divide the T-45TS program into components.
These components are exhibited in such a manner as to
clearly display their relationship to one another and to the
program as a whole. Each WBS element was then analyzed to
see if reductions could be made which would achieve the
desired savings while still retaining the system integrity.
The actual restructuring process followed a series of eight
steps, which are shown in Figure 12.
The Tiger Team responsibilities were assigned based on
the work breakdown structure, the cost estimate was divided
according to the work breakdown structure, and therefore,
the cost reduction targets were also established using the
work breakdown structure. The work breakdown structure was
uniquely suited to this type of operation as it clearly
defines the item or product to be developed and relates the
element of work to be accomplished to each other and the end
product. [Ref. 29]
One of the unique actions taken by the Tiger Team was
the sharing of cost estimates, in order to reach agreement
on the cost of each major element in the WBS. In doing
this, both the Navy and the contractor were forced to drop
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the normal adversarial roles played and become very frank
and honest with one another as to how the costs were con-
structed, and what was involved in each cost area. This is
generally not done, as it was a form of technical
negotiations. [Ref. 30]
What the Tiger Team did, in addition to assigning the
cost estimates by work breakdown structure, was to establish
targets for the reduction of costs by the same method. This
was an iterative means of achieving the necessary cost
savings. The Tiger Team, working from the specifications,
statement of work and contract data requirements list,
established new costs for each element, and then repeated
the process until the goals were reached. It took eleven
different sessions to restructure the WBS to reflect a
restructured program and establish a new cost estimate for
the T-45TS program.
The recommendations for restructuring were recorded and
tracked using a "T-45TS Restructure Chit," which used the
WBS element number as a point of reference. [Ref. 32] The
chit also addressed the specific impacts associated with
each action, such as risk. Risk was also divided into three
categories: technical, schedule and cost (see Figure 13)
.
The final product, consisting of the basic contract and
nineteen different attachments, was refined eventually into
a letter contract which was signed by the Navy and the
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contractor, Douglas Aircraft Company, on 2 October 1984.
[Ref. 30]
G. STREAMLINING RESULTS
There was a concerted effort made by T-4 5TS program
office to reduce costs from the time the source selection
process was completed in 1981. An initial scrub of the
requirements was conducted then to ensure that only the
hardware items considered essential would be included in the
contract. This involved a review and evaluation by both the
Chief of Naval Education and Training and the Chief of Naval
Air Training and the program sponsors in the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations to what requirements absolutely
must remain in the contract, and which could be dropped out
and have the T-45TS still perform the designated mission.
[Ref. 29]
During the demonstration/validation phase further cost
reductions were made by deleting a number of items such as
an aerial demonstration trainer, head-up and multimedia dis-
plays and an airborne computer. This resulted in a reduc-
tion of $83 million, from $810 million to $727 million.
Costs were later further reduced below the goal of $450
million to $438 million. [Ref. 29] A decision was made to
switch from organic logistic support to contractor mainte-
nance, which also resulted in significant cost savings.
However, the three areas which were most fruitful for
the streamlining effort were specifications, data
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requirements and testing (see Figure 14). There were 6,000
potential specifications (per General specification SD-24L)
which were initially reduced to 322 specifications, prior to
the Tiger Team effort. [Ref. 33] These 322 specifications
were cited in the Request For Proposal. Following the
streamlining efforts by the Tiger Team, the number of speci-
fication was reduced to 281. Currently 75% of the remaining
281 specifications have been tailored. Approximately 20% of
the referenced documents are existing British engineering
documents. [Ref. 33]
The data requirements were reduced from 530 items to 251
items. Twenty of the requirements were combined at the
systems level, so as to reduce duplication of effort. More
than 50% of the data requirements are to be submitted in
contractor format as opposed to requiring a contractor to
follow a specific format for the submission of government
data. [Ref. 33]
The third major area of reduction was in the testing
area. The number of ground test articles decreased from 3
to 2. This was accomplished by combining the drop and
static test articles, and also by moving the fatigue test
article to the front end of production in order to use a
more representative airframe for fatigue testing. [Ref. 32]
The number of flight test aircraft decreased from four
to two, and the number of contractor flight test hours also
66
T-45TS Development
Program Comparison
BEFORE AFTER
RESTRUCTURE RESTRUCTURE DELTA
FSED CONTRACT TYPE CPIF FFP
GROUND TEST ARTICLES 3 2 -1
FLIGHT TEST AIRCRAFT 4 2 -2
FLIGHT TEST HRS
CONTRACTOR 623 411
-212
NAVY DEVELOPMENT 160 160
|
NAVY TECH EVAL 90 90 I
NAVY OPTEST 40 40
i
1
AIRFRAME DESIGN BASICALLY
UNCHANGED
ENGINE OESIGN SIMPLIFIED
GTS DESIGN CHANGEO
SIMULATORS SIMPLIFIED SLIGHT
CAI SIMPLIFIED SMALL
TIS SIGNIFICANT CHANGE LARGE
DATA REQUIREMENTS 530 251 -279
SPECIFICATIONS 322 281 -41
RISKS
DESIGN LOW LOW UNCH
SCHEDULE LOW MODERATE INC
CONCURRENCY MOOERATE LOW OEC
PROGRAMMATIC LOW/MOO MODERATE INC
CONTRACTOR LOW LOW/MOO INC
INVESTMENT
LOGISTICS LOW/MOO LOW OEC
COST LOW/MOD LOW OEC
UNCH - UNCHANGEO; DEC - DECREASED;
INC - INCREASED; MOD - MODERATE
Source: [Ref. 29]
Figure 14. T-4 5TS Development Program Comparison
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decreased by 212 hours, from 623 hours to 411 hours. [Ref.
32]
The risks associated with the program were altered by
both the decision to change the type contract and by the
streamlining or restructuring effort (see Figure 14)
.
The schedule risk increased as the time to first flight
was shortened, there was simply less time in which to accom-
plish all which needed to be accomplished. However, the
risk associated with the concurrency between development and
production decreased as there was less overlap between the
two phases.
Much of the financial risk has been shifted from the
government to the contractor by the decision to change the
contract type from a cost-plus-incentive fee to firm-fixed-
price.
The T-45TS program to date appears to be a successful
example of what streamlining a program can accomplish.
However, there were two important points which need to be
remembered. First, the T-45TS program is a derivative
program, and therefore much of the risk associated with
state-of-the-art technology did not have to be addressed.
Second, there was a distinct advantage to working with only
one contractor, the McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Company.
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VI. ARMY STREAMLINED ACQUISITION PROGRAM (ASAP)
Acquisition streamlining, as viewed by the Army Materiel
Command, has a slightly different focus than it has in the
other services. In the Army's view, acquisition streamlin-
ing is one of seven combined initiatives which are part of
the Army Streamlined Acquisition Process, or ASAP (see
Figure 15)
.
ASAP is designed to improve the way the Army Materiel
Command (AMC) does its business. Under the leadership of
Gen. Richard H. Thompson, AMC is committed to not doing
business as usual. For many of the same reasons cited
earlier in this thesis, the Army has undertaken initiatives
to streamline or otherwise improve the acquisition process.
The Army has gone farther than any of the other services
in defining and embracing streamlining. It is not only
looking to streamline by tailoring requirements or eliminat-
ing accidentally referenced or premature requirements, it is
looking to streamline the entire acquisition process. For
purposes of this discussion, each of the seven elements of
the Army Streamlined Acquisition Program will be discussed
separately.
A. NON-DEVELOPMENTAL ITEMS (NDI)
The Army has been moving increasingly in the direction
of NDI in the past few years, and is actively involved in
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procuring the Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) through the
use of NDI.
In June of 198 6, the Packard Commission made a recommen-
dation in its final report to the president, concerning the
expanded use of commercial products by the Department of
Defense. [Ref. 35]
What it proposed was an inversion of DoD buying policy
—
buy commercial or non-developmental items which are readily
available in the commercial marketplace as opposed to
relying on "excessively rigid military specifications." The
Packard Commission recommended that;
DoD should make greater use of components, systems and
services available 'off-the-shelf.' It should develop new
or custom-made items only when it has been established
that those readily available are clearly inadequate to
meet military requirements. [Ref. 35]
One of the major arguments for military specifications
has always been that they guarantee a certain level of
quality by purchasing off-the-shelf type items as opposed to
items made to military specifications. DoD is essentially
making private industry responsible, and accountable, for
the quality of the items purchased by DoD. One of the
difficulties will be how DoD will measure the quality of
items purchased off-the-shelf.
Traditionally, it has been the government's practice to
"inspect quality in," rather than require industry to design
or produce quality products. The Packard Commission took
exception to this, as it is the least efficient means of
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exception to this, as it is the least efficient means of
increasing quality. With the increased use of buying com-
mercial items, DoD will have to look for a new means of
ensuring quality.
One means of ensuring quality, is for DoD to accept
certification of a producer by a civilian organization which
will certify that the producer and his processes meet
certain approval levels. This would permit significant cost
savings in terms of reduced number of DoD inspections.
DoD must also ensure that the application of the product
being procured off-the-shelf is clearly defined, so as to
preclude mismatches between the product and the environment
it will have to function in.
Overall, there appears to be several good reasons to
purchase NDI: lower cost, less schedule risk, less
technological obsolescence, and less time to acquire a
system. By shifting the burden of responsibility for
quality from the government to the contractor, it appears
that DoD has a greater chance of acquiring quality products
than in the past, and at a lower and less risk for the
government
.
On the other hand, it appears that evaluating a proposal
for an NDI system would be difficult without having MIL-
specifications or MIL-standards to measure it against. This
would appear to open the evaluation to being more subjective
and flexible, as the decision to choose one product over
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another must be based on the government's decision of what
will best meet or satisfy their requirements.
Also, the potential impact of NDI on the DoD logistics
system must be addressed. The purchase of off-the-shelf
items in large quantities will definitely affect the supply
system, as it will generate masses of new stock numbers, or
manufacturer's parts numbers. The Military Parts Control
Advisory Group (MPCAG) who administers the DoD Parts Control
Program, cites an example of one MIL standard part which can
be used as a substitute for 38 manufacturer's part numbers.
[Ref. 36]
There also may be a trend toward increased costs in
order to maintain adequate stockage levels of parts. In the
same example cited above, MPCAG found that there was a
reduction in cost of 5:1 experienced by those utilizing the
MIL specification in the procurement of the part. (Ref. 36]
It must also be recognized, and accepted by the users,
that the NDI approach provides a system which may not meet
all the desired features, at least not at first. However,
through the use of another ASAP initiative, Preplanned Pro-
duct Improvement, the system may eventually fulfill all the
desired features.
Therefore, in order to NDI to be part of a successful
acquisition strategy, it must have total support from the
user community, the acquisition team, and the senior level
of command. The user and the senior level of command must
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be willing to accept the tradeoff between cost and schedule
on the one hand, and not quite as desirable a product on the
other. Depending on the type of product or equipment being
procured, this may be acceptable or not. It is a decision
which impacts all phases of the life cycle of the item being
procured.
B. PREPLANNED PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT
The heart of the Army's streamlined acquisition process
is Preplanned Product Improvement (P3I) an evolutionary
development strategy. It is accomplished by reducing the
current requirements and planning for incremental improve-
ments. The improvements should plan for, or take into
account, any perceived threat changes or new state of the
art technology which has become available. Through the use
of P3I, the Army is able to field a weapon system sooner
than one which is being developed by the traditional means
of development.
The concept of P3I is not a new one. The Army has never
acquired a major system that wasn't improved during its
active life cycle. The current advanced state of technology
has not changed this, if anything it has caused a fairly
constant increase since 1978, as can be seen in Figure 16.
The costs of these improvements are significant as they
averaged over $1.0 million during each of 1980, 1981, and
1982. [Ref. 37]
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FUNDING REQUIREMENTS
ARMY PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM
(ALL APPROPRIATIONS $ IN MILLIONS)
1,216.0
1.297.5
1,000.0
Source: [Ref. 37]
Figure 16. Funding Requirements
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What is relatively new, though, is "preplanned" improve-
ments. That is the critical difference between the revolu-
tionary method of product improvement and the evolutionary.
The revolutionary means of developing improvements is
the way the Army has traditionally done business. The
improvements had to be developed in much the same way as the
systems themselves. This is a costly, time-consuming means
of improving a system, as the product improvements average 5
1/2 years for major systems, which is about half the time it
takes to develop a new system. [Ref. 37]
The evolutionary means of preplanning for improvements
is a time-phased method of meeting the requirement. In
order to best utilize P3I, the user must be willing to
reduce the requirement in order to not push the state of the
art, and to plan for phased incremental improvements over
time.
By consciously planning ahead for improvements, the user
will not only receive the system faster, in the long term he
will end up with a system which does more. For example,
look at Figure 17 which demonstrates the difference in the
two types of development.
The top layer of the chart is the revolutionary way of
developing weapon systems, or the way the Army has tradi-
tionally fielded its weapons. The bottom layer demonstrates
the evolutionary approach, or P3I. By utilizing P3I the
Army is able to move the initial operation capability
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forward, so to field the system faster. This does not field
a less capable system against a more capable threat. What
it does is produce a responsive system against a less
technologically advanced enemy by virtue of fielding the
system sooner. It also provides, and plans, for block
upgrades which result in a better system technologically
over the long term.
There are several keys to ensuring success with P3I.
The first is the user's understanding and acceptance of the
process as being one of incremental changes which are phased
in. The second key is an accurate assessment of the pro-
jected changes in both technology and the threat. Funding
is the last key, and without it the others would be useless.
There must be firm commitments from the user community to
plan and budget for the incremental changes, otherwise the
system would quickly become obsolete technology.
The objective of Preplanned Product Improvement is to
extend the useful service life of weapon systems. As such
it will generate savings, both in time and cost, which is
what the ASAP program is all about.
C. REORIENTATION OF FORMAL MILESTONES
The streamlining of the acquisition process is a revolu-
tionary part of the ASAP designed to shorten the time
between the initiation of a new requirement and the fielding
of the new system or equipment.
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In the past, development time was measured from the
beginning of advanced development to the Initial Operation
Capability (IOC) . Under ASAP, that is no longer the case as
it eliminates the demonstration/validation phase and
Milestone II from the process and restructures the other two
research and development phases (see Figure 18) . This means
a development program will go from the "proof-of-principle"
phase to a collapsed Milestone I/II which will be held at
the entry to full development and will represent a "go/no
go" commitment to the program. [Ref. 34]
The "proof-of-principle" phase will be a combination of
what is currently known as two phases: concept exploration
and demonstration/validation. It will employ the extensive
use of prototypes in technical demonstrations in order to
verify both the operational concept and the hardware in the
early stages of the program.
The prove-out process will also include prototypes in
the hands of user troops. Troops of such units as the 9th
Infantry Division or Ft. Hood, will be utilized to demon-
strate the maturity of the technology prior to entering
development.
The four year focus of the ASAP will begin with the
Milestone I/II decision and end with the Milestone III
decision. In other words, the development and production
prove-out phase is the four year goal.
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Throughout the entire process, testing will be conducted
as efficiently as possible by utilizing a common test data
base. The data base will provide actual results to everyone
involved, and will permit the dissemination of test data
more quickly. It will also provide for better responsive-
ness and evaluation. This is not to say that testing will
not be conducted in an independent and scientific environ-
ment, just that those tests which can be conducted more
efficiently, will be.
The final link in the streamlined acquisition process is
the formation of the Laboratory Command (LABCOM) to oversee
and coordinate research efforts. It is planned that the
creation of LABCOM will permit the Army to recognize and
explore further these areas which are currently under
development and show the most promise. [Ref. 34]
The ASAP tailored development cycle is a dramatic change
toward shortening the acquisition process.
D. STREAMLINED REQUIREMENTS
The Army's approach in this area has been similar to
what is being done in the other services, it is utilizing
the talent available in private industry by telling the
contractor what it wants, and not how to do it, or how to
manage his business.
The Army has been doing this through the increased use
of performance specifications which tell the contractor what
the system is supposed to do, as opposed to telling the
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contractor how to build it. Other ideas which industry has
been providing are recommendations to eliminate unnecessary
contract requirements or contract data items, and tailored
specifications and standards.
The RFP for the Anti-Task Weapon System-Medium (AAWS-M)
was one of the first RFP's to be streamlined. The results,
cited in a June 1986 article of Government Executive , showed
the RFP had decreased from 498 pages to 219 pages. [Ref.
38]
E. UTILIZATION OF TROOP DEMONSTRATIONS
The utilization of user troops to demonstrate the
maturity of technology prior to production was touched
briefly upon in the discussion of the tailored development
process.
The Army is concerned with the man-machine interface
requirements, impact on command and control, soldier accep-
tability as well as the hardware performance and therefore,
is planning to utilize the 9th Infantry Division test bed in
order to test the technology. [Ref. 39]
By utilizing a prototype system in the hands of troops
prior to development, the Army will be able to not only test
the maturity of the technology, it will also be able to test
the operational concepts, and to gain experience in how the
system will perform in the field environment.
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F. SMOOTH TRANSITION TO PRODUCTION
The Army is looking to utilize prototypes built on hard
production tooling wherever possible. Gen. Thompson,
speaking in the August edition of ARMY , stated,
We will include prove-out of the production process as
part of our full-scale development effort because we have
learned the hard way that it pays off—in time, money, and
credibility—to do this before we enter production. [Ref.
34]
This form of testing is intended to provide valuable
information and assist in the certification of operational
suitability needed to go into full-scale production. It was
also a recommendation of the Packard Commission. [Ref. 35]
G. STAFF DRAFT REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENTS AND/OR RFP
Draft Request For Proposals (RFP's) are being used by
the Army to solicit input from private industry prior to
formally issuing the RFP. To date, draft RFP's have been
used for the engine and airframe proposals for the Light
Helicopter Family (LHX) , the 120 millimeter Anti-Tank Weapon
System-Medium (AAWS-M) , the 120 millimeter Mortar System,
the Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) and the Army Tactical
Missile System (ATACMS) . [Ref. 40]
The process for utilizing a draft RFP for the Army
Tactical Missile System was an iterative process. The Army
first ensured that the requirements for what would become
the Army Tactical Missile System were only the minimum
essential. This involved extensive coordination between the
user community and the acquisition team.
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A decision was made that Preplanned Product Improvement
would be part of the acquisition strategy, and this had to
be clearly communicated to industry along with the other
requirements. Contractors were also encouraged to use off-
the-shelf type items in their proposals.
The draft Request for Proposal for the Army TACMS full
scale development was reviewed by potential contractors, and
the contractor's comments were evaluated by the "various
major subordinate command functional organizations . . .
[Ref. 40] The changes were incorporated prior to final
release of the RFP.
The use of draft RFP's is a means of utilizing the
talent available in private industry to best meet the
requirements of the Army. It allows prospective contractors
the opportunity to identify elements in the proposal that
they believe add cost with little or no resulting benefit or
to propose alternate solutions without being under the
threat of being found non responsive.
It also places the Army in the role of not telling the
contractors how to manage or how to perform. The Army
simply provides the requirements to the contractors who will
then make the appropriate tradeoffs among cost, schedule and
performance, and design, what they believe is a system which
will best satisfy the Army's needs.
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H. SUMMARY OF THE ASAP INITIATIVES
The Army to date has embarked on an extremely ambitious
program to streamline the acquisition process.
Technology has been changing so rapidly and the acquisi-
tion process has become so lengthy, that weapon systems have
a good possibility of being obsolete before they are
fielded. In addition to the rate at which technology has
been changing, the Army is also trying to handle outdated or
overage specifications and standards which are being used to
procure the equipment or weapon systems. Add to that the
change in the perceived threat, and the shift in direction
and focus which emanates from the Congress, and "change" has
become a significant issue.
The Army Streamlined Acquisition Process is a means of
handling the complex issues of technological change,
obsolete, outdated specifications and standards and an
extremely cumbersome acquisition process. It involves not
only substantial changes in how the Army conducts its acqui-
sition "business," it also involves significant shift in
attitudes about the role of the program manager, user and
the contractor, who should bear the risk and responsibility
for performance.
ASAP is directed toward streamlining the entire
acquisition process, beginning with how the user views the
requirements, whether he can be "satisfied" with a nondevel-
opmental type system or one which employs the concept of
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preplanned product improvement rather than developing an
entirely revolutionary system which pushes the state of the
art in technology and may take 10-15 years to complete the
acquisition process.
ASAP is designed to give the Army flexibility in procur-
ing affordable, reliable systems by maximizing the resources
available in both the Army community and private industry in
order to best support the needs of the soldier.
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VII. IMPLEMENTATION OF DODD 5000.43:
ACQUISITION STREAMLINING
Acquisition streamlining has been implemented. This
study has focused on a limited number of programs in which
streamlining has been utilized to date. The use of stream-
lining in a few pilot programs, while important, doesn't
really serve as evidence that streamlining has been imple-
mented by the Department of Defense. Only the incorporation
of streamlining into the management policies and procedures
of the Department of Defense so that it becomes institution-
alized, will do that.
OSD issued the DoD Directive 5000.43, "Acquisition
Streamlining," on January 15, 1986. It established that the
policy for acquisition streamlining and specifically tasked
the Heads of the Military Departments to:
a. Designate an advocate (Flag rank or Senior Executive
Service) within each Department
b. Ensure the review of all applicable systems and equip-
ment to ensure compliance with acquisition
streamlining
c. Ensure appropriate training of acquisition personnel
d. Develop a program to recognize outstanding performance
in acquisition streamlining
e. Prepare an Acquisition Streamlining Plan, updated
annually, to be forwarded to ASD (A&L)
.
What this chapter will describe is how each of these
taskings has been implemented by the Army and the Navy.
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There has been an immeasurable amount of publicity created
about streamlining, but until it is institutionalized in the
management policies and practices, business will continue as
usual. Each of the above mentioned taskings will be
explored separately, and the best examples of implementation
will be cited.
A. DESIGNATE AN ADVOCATE
1. Army—Mr. Roy D. Greene
2. Navy—Mr. Gerard Hoffmann
B. ENSURE REVIEW OF ALL APPLICABLE SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT AT
EACH PHASE
The new (September 1986) Army Materiel Command
Regulation 70-5, "Materiel Acquisition Decision Process
(MADP) Reviews," discusses MADP Reviews which should ensure
that: [Ref. 41]
1. Both NDI and ASAP initiatives have been considered in
selecting the acquisition strategy.
2. DoDD 5000.43 is incorporated into the acquisition
strategy.
The Secretary of the Navy issued SECNAVINST 4210.6,
November 20, 1985, subject: Acquisition Policy [Ref. 42],
It required the Specification Control Advocate General
(SPECAG) to certify, prior to Full Scale Engineering Devel-
opment, "that development specifications, including the con-
tract data requirements list, have been reviewed and
tailored." [Ref. 42]
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In order to accomplish this, the commander of each
appropriate activity must provide a certification certifi-
cate to the SPECAG. Then the SPECAG must in turn, certify
to the CNO, who also then certifies to the Secretary of the
Navy that the requirements have been streamlined.
Secretary Pyatt, in a memorandum dated April 2, 198 6,
also recommended to commanders of the major system commands
that they "consider streamlining efforts during (your)
internal program reviews." [Ref. 43]
Another example of reviewing "systems" would be the
individual system commands looking internally at how they
could best utilize acquisition streamlining. One command,
NAVSEA, has done this.
Under the direction of VADM Webber, the Chief Engineer
of the Navy, and Mr. W. Tarbell, Deputy Commander for Acqui-
sition, Planning, and Appraisal, NAVSEA established a task
group to define how to best institutionalize acquisition
streamlining within NAVSEA. The objective was to determine
if the requirements in the typical NAVSEA acquisition soli-
citation can be streamlined and, if so, the best approach to
achieve the goal. [Ref. 44]
The final report was issued on July 31, 1986. It con-
tains a number of excellent recommendations and comments,
which "will minimize requirements and the associated costs
of (our) programs without compromising quality." [Ref. 44]
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It will also be used to assist in implementing streamlining
within NAVSEA.
C. ENSURE APPROPRIATE TRAINING OF ACQUISITION PERSONNEL
The Specification Control Advocate General of the Navy
issued in September, 1986, an Acquisition Streamlining Guide
[Ref. 7]. It is a comprehensive discussion of the Stream-
lining Initiative, written to be used by those who will
actually be involved in the process of teaching and utiliz-
ing streamlining.
It begins with an identification of the need for stream-
lining and what the objectives are. Then it introduces the
basic principles behind streamlining, discusses the applica-
tion of these principles, and concludes with several case
studies which can be utilized to practice streamlining.
It also identifies all the Department of the Navy
Streamlining Advocates by major command. They would be the
ones responsible for training the personnel within each com-
mand. In the course of the research for this study, the
Streamlining Advocates for NAVAIR, NAVSEA and SPAWAR were
interviewed. They provided excellent insights into how each
command was organizing and conducting their training.
SPAWAR has instituted an aggressive education plan
within the command. They view education and training as an
integral part of institutionalizing the process, and
participation by all management, engineering and logistics
personnel is mandatory. [Ref. 45]
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Four seminars were held between March and June, 1986,
for top level and middle level managers. One hundred fifty-
six managers and supervisors completed the one hour session.
Also, five working level classes and workshops were
conducted for 79 engineers and logisticians, and another 226
are scheduled to attend. [Ref. 45]
NAVSEA has focused on the improvement of specifications,
both from the Navy's point of view as the buying organiza-
tion, as well as from the contractors focus as the producer
or actual user of the specification.
Training courses in the preparation of specifications
and standards are being conducted for NAVSEA personnel,
emphasizing streamlining. The intent is to provide engineer
specifications writers with information and guidance to
assist not only in the preliminary planning, but also in the
evaluation of the cost and effects of specifications on
shipbuilding.
The other aspect of specification streamlining is
industry participation, which involves a learning process.
NAVSEA has recognized this and has actively sought industry
participation and involvement by soliciting comments from
thirteen major shipbuilders on the General Specifications
for Ships. It has also conducted visits with four ship-
builders in order to secure the contractors assistance in
streamlining. [Ref. 46]
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This program to improve specifications appears to be
working. The number of specifications which have a high
priority for updating are down by 64%, while the number of
specifications being updated are up by 72% (these figures
were current as of September 4, 1986). [Ref. 46] A more
detailed explanation can be seen by reviewing Figure 19.
D. DEVELOP A PROGRAM TO RECOGNIZE OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE
IN ACQUISITION STREAMLINING
The March-April 1986, Program Manager . featured an
article entitled, "Streamlining Has Begun to Pay Off" [Ref.
47]. It featured the Deputy Secretary of Defense, William
H. Taft IV presenting four Department of Defense Streamlin-
ing Excellence Awards at the Second National Conference on
Acquisition Streamlining.
The program managers were being recognized for the out-
standing effort each of them had accomplished in the area of
acquisition streamlining. Two of the program managers
recognized were the program managers for the T-45TS and the
LHX programs.
E. PREPARE AN ACQUISITION STREAMLINING PLAN
On August 8, 1986, Everett Pyatt, Assistant Secretary of
the Navy (Shipbuilding and Logistics) , issued the Navy Pro-
gram Plan for Acquisition Streamlining [Ref. 48], In the
Memorandum which accompanied the plan, Secretary Pyatt
stated,
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STATUS AND PRIORITIES
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Source: [Ref. 46]
Figure 19. Status and Priorities
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the principles of acquisition streamlining . . . are
necessary for good business and must be forcefully applied
throughout the acquisition process. The potential for
savings is significant, and we must not compromise our
ability to provide the Fleet with the quantity and quality
of weapons systems needed. [Ref. 48]
The Navy Plan states, "Acquisition Streamlining is
mandatory and applies throughout the Department of the Navy
for all systems and equipment acquisitions." [Ref. 48] It
continues by listing seven items under the Plan of Action:
1. In each SYSCOM, establish a program that will identify
and review procurements by methodically challenging
any contractual documents for excessive requirements
as well as provide for remedial actions.
2
.
Institute formal awareness programs for both top
management and working level personnel. This should
include seminars and training courses.
3. Establish formal recognition programs to acknowledge
personnel contributions in eliminating or reducing
non-cost-effective contract requirements.
4. Promote and encourage joint military service and DLA
cooperation in efforts to achieve the Acquisition
Streamlining Initiatives and to provide for the cross-
fertilization of ideas, techniques and procedures.
5. Establish dedicated funding resources for the Navy's
Acquisition Streamlining Initiatives and efforts.
Simultaneously, emphasize support for the Standardiza-
tion and Value Engineering Program's budgets and
efforts. This emphasis is needed to review and chal-
lenge the requirements in specifications, standards,
engineering drawings and other standardization docu-
mentation, during developing design and production
phases.
6. In each system's command, establish a central office
and identify dedicated personnel responsible for the
administration of the respective SYSCOM Acquisition
Streamlining Initiative.
7. Conduct a semi-annual flag-level review of each sys-
tem's command's overall progress in promoting and
enhancing acquisition streamlining. This review is to
be chaired by ASN (S&L) with the Director, ONAS and
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Specification Control Advocate General in attendance.
[Ref. 1]
The Navy plan establishes specific objectives within the
Department of the Navy for acquisition streamlining. The
first several items echo the taskings of DoDD 5000.43, as in
reviewing requirements, establishing training and developing
formal recognition programs for outstanding performance in
acquisition streamlining.
The Navy plan goes farther though. It also provides for
joint military and DLA cooperation in streamlining. Then,
too, it clearly instructs each SYSCOM to not only establish
a program to review requirements, but also institutionalizes
streamlining by charging the SYSCOMs to establish an office
and personnel, and most importantly, to dedicate funds to
the effort.
F. SUMMARY
Acquisition streamlining is in the process of being
implemented and institutionalized in not only the targeted
pilot programs, but also in the lower levels within the
individual services and commands.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS. RECOMMENDATIONS AND
AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
A. OVERVIEW
In the process of this study, a number of programs and
initiatives were studied. Each approached the concept of
acquisition streamlining from a slightly different aspect.
Some looked to streamline only the specifications, others
looked at reducing or combining -the testing requirements,
utilizing contractor maintenance and logistic support, while
others looked to rewrite the entire acquisition process.
There is a measure of worth in all the approaches, as
the lessons learned can be a source of aid for future
streamliners. What is important to remember is that there
is more than one to streamline. Streamlining involves
tailoring the requirements, specifications and standards to
best fit each program, remembering that each program is
basically unique and therefore what is the best solution for
one, is not necessarily the best solution for all.
B. CONCLUSIONS
This research has led to a number of conclusions regard-
ing the implementation of the Streamlining Initiative, and
its effects.
Conclusion 1. Acquisition streamlining. per DoDD
5000.43. is being implemented . It has, and is, being used
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to specify the contractual requirements in terms of perform-
ance specifications, rather than design specifications, as
evidenced by the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS)
request for proposal. It is also being used to tailor the
contractual requirements to the unique circumstances of each
program, and limit the contractual applicability of
referenced documents, which can clearly be seen with the T-
4 5TS program.
Conclusion 2. Acquisition streamlining is being
institutionalized . It has become part of the regulations
and instructions, as evidenced by the discussion in the
chapter on the implementation of DoDD 5000.43. It was obvi-
ous that some of the services have gone farther with their
plans, than others.
Conclusion 3 . There exists a number of impediments to
streamlining . The greatest of these is the attitude, "that
we have always done it this way, and it worked, why change?"
Once a requirement becomes written on a printed page, it may
as well be written in concrete. The majority of federal
employees, military or civilian, are conditioned to repeat-
ing the lessons learned in the past, especially if they were
successful. In order to effectively utilize the concept of
streamlining, we must be willing to take risk, and our
system, whether it be military or civil service, does not
generally reward risk-takers.
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Therefore, the difficulty is two-fold. First, we must
encourage innovation and creative solutions to meeting
requirements, and then we must also recognize that there is
a price which may have to be paid for daring to be
different.
Conclusion 4. Specifications and standards are the
"corporate memory" of DoD . Many of the specifications and
standards were written as a result of specific lessons
learned, and it is difficult to find someone conversant with
the requirement who can also be objective.
Conclusion 5. The Preplanned Product Improvement
initiative is absolutely crucial to the Army Streamlined
Acquisition Program . Given the current environment, the
approach for new weapon systems will more than likely not
include new starts. Therefore, the technological improve-
ments will have to come from Preplanned Product Improve-
ments. This will permit block upgrades every 3-5 years, if
the funding has been planned, programmed and budgeted for.
Without funding for the P3I, the weapon systems fielded will
quickly become obsolete technology.
Conclusion 6. The use of NDI together with P3I can
assist in fielding a less costly weapon system sooner . By
utilizing NDI together with P3I, the Army will not be
pushing the state of the art in technology, which will
decrease the cost and schedule risk. However, by planning
to incorporate changes as they become available on the
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market allows the system to be dynamic rather static. This
permits the system to adapt to changes in the perceived
threat.
Conclusion 7. The reorientation of the formal mile-
stones during the major weapon system acquisition process
actually extends the time for concept exploration . This
appears to be a means of granting the Army more time to
explore and prove the technology before entering full
development. This permits more time for the concept to be
tested, and reworked prior to a firm commitment. As the
majority of the life cycle costs are incurred during the
design and development phases, this allows them to be given
more consideration.
Conclusion 8. The use of draft Request For Proposals
may cause a relook at how proposals are evaluated . The
government is now looking at providing only performance
requirements to the contractors, and permitting them to
determine how to best satisfy the requirements. This is
quite different from evaluating a proposal based on design
specifications furnished to the contractors. Under this
method, the draft proposal actually becomes the baseline
against which the proposals are evaluated, and the decision
becomes more subjective as there must be a determination of
what best satisfies the gowernment's needs or requirements.
Conclusion 9. The systems such as the T-45TS have not
vet reached the point in their acquisition cycles during
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which the significant cost growth or schedule slippages
usually occur . It is very early yet to declare the
acquisition streamlining effort a total success, though at
this point in time, it appears to be working quite well.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
As a result of this research effort, the following
recommendations are presented.
Recommendation 1. A comprehensive training plan, simi-
lar to what NAVSEA and SPAWAR have instituted needs to be
developed and implemented by all the services and commands .
The two commands mentioned have established specific goals,
training and implementation plans and are actively involved
in educating their people in how to best utilize the stream-
lining concept. This is the only means of overcoming the
greatest impediment to streamlining—attitude.
Recommendation 2. A basis for measurement, or evalua-
tion, of streamlining effort needs to be devised . To date,
there has been little concern for how a streamlining effort
will be measured. Whether the basis for evaluation will be
cost avoidance, number of specifications cited in the pro-
curement document, number of NDI produced, number of Change
Orders processed, cost or schedule variances or some other
measures, needs to be addressed. As it is, programs are
being cited as successes based on varying criteria.
Recommendation 3. There is a cost for streamlining,
which may need to be taken into account when savings are
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cited . The T-45TS streamlining effort involved extensive
work by a joint government-contractor team. The use of
draft RFP's is calling upon the contractors to utilize their
staffs to streamline and make recommendations. All of this
effort has a cost associated with it. It needs to be offset
against any savings claimed in order to gain an accurate
picture of the benefits or gains achieved by streamlining.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Streamlining is addressing the tip of the iceberg.
However, what lies beneath the surface is the entire Defense
Specifications and Standardization Program and the organiza-
tions charged with the responsibility of writing and main-
taining specifications and standards.
The "symptoms" of overage redundant, ambiguous, obsolete
specifications and standards is being challenged by stream-
lining; the "problem" is to change how specifications and
standards are generated. The organizations tasked with
writing specifications and standards are highly decentra-
lized, they report to, and work for individual commanders.
The Defense Materiel Specifications and Standards Board
(DMSSB) establishes broad guidance, but it is left to the
individual standards writing groups to translate that
guidance into objectives and action.
Each service, and DLA, are responsible for their own
standards writing organizations. They each must budget,
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fund, and staff their organizations. How this is done
varies widely among the services and DLA.
The user communities are not involved in the writing of
the standards to the extent they need to be, as standards
writing has apparently evolved into a rather rigid documen-
tation procedure rather than an engineering support
function.
There needs to be further research done in the area of
the Defense Standardization and Specification Program
(DSSP)
.
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